Hardening the ElGamal Cryptosystem in the Setting of the Second Group of Units

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Abstract: The Elgamal encryption scheme is best described in the setting of any finite cyclic group. Its classic case is typically presented in the multiplicative group \( Z_p^* \) of the ring of integers modulo a prime \( p \) and the multiplicative groups \( \mathbb{F}_{p^m}^* \) of finite fields of characteristic two. The Elgamal cryptosystem was modified to deal with Gaussian integers, and extended to work with group of units of \( Z_q[x]/\langle x^2 \rangle \). In this paper, we consider an extension to the Elgamal cryptosystem employing the second group of units of \( Z_n \) and the second group of units of \( Z_4[x]/\langle h(x) \rangle \), where \( h(x) \) is an irreducible polynomial. We describe the arithmetic needed in the new setting, and present examples, proofs and algorithms to illustrate the applicability of the proposed scheme. We implement our algorithms and conduct testing to evaluate the accuracy, efficiency and security of the modified cryptographic scheme.

Keywords: Second group of units of \( z \), and \( z_4[x]/\langle h(x) \rangle \), elgamal cryptosystem, and baby step giant step attack algorithm.

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1. Introduction

The Classical Elgamal Public Key encryption scheme is perhaps one of the most popular and widely used cryptosystems. It is described in the setting of the multiplicative group \( Z_p^* \). The multiplicative group of \( Z_p = \{1, 2, \ldots, p-1\} \) is a cyclic group generated by a generator from the group [9]. The following algorithms show how the Elgamal cryptosystem functions:

Algorithm 1: Key Generation
A should do the following:
1. Generate a large random prime \( p \) and find the generator \( a \) of \( Z_p^* \).
2. Select a random integer \( a, 1 \leq a \leq p-2 \) and compute \( a^ω \mod p \).
3. A's public key is \((p, a, α^ω)\) and A's private key is \( a \).

Algorithm 2: Encryption
B should do the following:
1. Obtain A's authentic public key \((p, a, α^ω)\).
2. Represent the message as an integer \( m \) in the range \( \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, p-1\} \).
3. Select a random integer \( k, 2 \leq k \leq p-2 \).
4. Compute \( γ = α^k \mod p \) and \( δ = m.(α^ω)^k \mod p \).
5. Send the ciphertext \( c = (γ, δ) \) to A.

Algorithm 3: Decryption
A should do the following:
1. Use the private key \( a \) to compute \( γ^ω \mod p \).
2. Compute \( c \equiv γ^{-ω} \cdot δ \mod p \) to recover the message \( m \).

However, the Elgamal cryptosystem can be generalized to work in any finite cyclic group \( G \). The security of the scheme is based on the intractability of the Discrete Logarithm Problem [12] in the group \( G \). \( G \) should be carefully chosen so that the group operations in \( G \) would be relatively easy to apply for efficiency. Moreover, the Discrete Logarithm Problem in \( G \) should be computationally infeasible.

Cross [3] gave a classification of all Gaussian integers \( β \) such that the group of units of the quotient ring \( Z[i]/\langle β \rangle \) is cyclic. So, one may consider Elgamal public-key cryptosystem using the cyclic group of units of \( Z[i]/\langle β \rangle \), where \( β = 1+i, (1+i)^2, (1+i)^3, p, (1+i) p, \pi, (1+i) \pi, p \) is a prime integer of the form \( 4k+3 \), and \( \pi \) is a Gaussian prime with \( |π|^2 \) a prime integer of the form \( 4k+1 \).

In [6], the authors described the second group of units of \( Z_n \), denoted by \( U^2(Z_n) \), and characterized the cases for \( n \) that make \( U^2(Z_n) \) cyclic. They applied the Elgamal scheme in \( U^2(Z_n) \) (in the cases where it is cyclic).

The authors in [10] determined the structure of the group of units of \( Z_n[x]/\langle f(x) \rangle \), where \( f(x) \) is a polynomial over a finite field \( F_q \) of order \( q \). Using this decomposition, a characterization of the quotient ring of polynomials over finite fields with cyclic group of units was given. In [8], this classification was applied to extend Elgamal scheme to the settings of the group of units of \( Z_4[x]/\langle x^2 \rangle \) and \( Z_2[x]/\langle h(x) \rangle \), where \( h(x) \) is a
product of irreducible polynomials whose degrees are pairwise relatively prime.

The purpose of this paper is to use the characterization of the quotient ring of polynomials over finite fields and the characterization of the second group of units in order to apply the Elgamal scheme in the second group of units of \( \mathbb{Z}[x]/<h(x)> \), where \( h(x) \) is an irreducible polynomial of degree \( n \).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the second group of units of \( \mathbb{Z} \) and describes the construction of \( U^2(\mathbb{Z}_n) \). In section 3, the construction of the second group of units of \( \mathbb{Z}[x]/<h(x)> \), where \( h(x) \) is an irreducible polynomial, is illustrated. Section 4 investigates the Elgamal scheme in this setting. Section 5 tests and evaluates the modified algorithms. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.

2. The Elgamal Cryptosystem over the Second Group of Units of \( \mathbb{Z}_n \)

Before discussing the extended Elgamal cryptosystem, we present the following theorems and definitions that are necessary for our work.

- **Theorem 1:** Fundamental Theorem of Abelian Groups, every finite Abelian group is a direct product of cyclic groups of prime power order [1].

  Let \( R \) be a finite commutative ring with identity. By the fundamental theorem of finite Abelian groups, the group of units, \( U(R) \), is isomorphic to the direct product of cyclic groups, say \( U(R) \cong \mathbb{Z}_{n_1} \times \mathbb{Z}_{n_2} \times \ldots \times \mathbb{Z}_{n_k} \). Hence, the multiplicative group \( U(R) \) supports a ring structure by defining the operations \( \oplus \) and \( \otimes \) that make \( (U(R), \oplus, \otimes) \) a ring isomorphic to the direct sum \( \mathbb{Z}_{n_1} \oplus \mathbb{Z}_{n_2} \oplus \ldots \oplus \mathbb{Z}_{n_k} \). The ring \( \mathbb{Z}_{n_1} \oplus \mathbb{Z}_{n_2} \oplus \ldots \oplus \mathbb{Z}_{n_k} \) is denoted as \( R^\oplus \).

- **Definition 1:** The second group of units of \( R \) is defined as the group of units of the ring \( U(R) \) [6]: \( U^2(R) = U(U(R)) \cong U(R^\oplus) \).

The authors considered the problem of determining the values of \( n \) that make \( U^2(\mathbb{Z}_n) \) cyclic. The result was as follows:

- **Theorem 2:** Let \( p \) and \( q \) be odd prime integers and \( \alpha \) be a positive integer. Then, \( U^2(\mathbb{Z}_n) \) is cyclic if one of the following is true:
  1. \( n = 2^\alpha.3.p \), where \( \alpha = 1, 2 \) or 3.
  2. \( n = 15 \).
  3. \( n = 3.p \), where \( p = 4k+3 \) and \( 2k+1 = q^\alpha \).
  4. \( n = 2^\alpha.3 \), \( 2^\alpha.3.p \), or \( 2^\alpha.3 \).
  5. \( n = 2, 4, 8, 16 \).
  6. \( n = 5 \) or \( 2p^\alpha + 1 \), where \( 2p^\alpha + 1 \) is a prime integer.
  7. \( n = 3^\alpha \).

The results can be classified into two cases:

- **Case 1:** Both \( U(\mathbb{Z}_n) \) and \( U^2(\mathbb{Z}_n) \) are cyclic, as known \( U(\mathbb{Z}_n) \) is cyclic when \( n = 2, 4, p^\alpha \) or \( 2p^\alpha \), where \( \alpha \geq 1 \) and \( p \) is an odd prime integer. So out of the previous seven cases for \( n \), only the following belong to case 1:
  1. \( n = 2.3^\alpha \), since \( n \) is in the form of \( 2p^\alpha \).
  2. \( n = 2 \) or \( 4 \).
  3. \( n = 5 \) or \( 2p^\alpha + 1 \), where \( 2p^\alpha + 1 \) is a prime integer.
  4. \( n = 3^\alpha \), since \( n \) is a power of an odd prime.

- **Case 2:** \( U^2(\mathbb{Z}_n) \) is cyclic, whereas \( U(\mathbb{Z}_n) \) is not cyclic:
  1. \( n = 2^\alpha.3.p \), where \( \alpha = 1, 2 \) or 3.
  2. \( n = 15 \).
  3. \( n = 3.p \), where \( p = 4k+3 \) and \( 2k+1 = q^\alpha \).
  4. \( n = 2^\alpha.3 \), \( 2^\alpha.3.p \), or \( 2^\alpha.3 \).
  5. \( n = 8 \), or 16.

To construct the second group of units \( U^2(\mathbb{Z}_n) \), we follow these steps:

1. Form the group of units \( U(\mathbb{Z}_n) = \{ a \in \mathbb{Z}_n : \gcd(a,n) = 1 \} \). The order of \( U(\mathbb{Z}_n) \) is \( \varphi(n) \).
2. Find a generator \( r \) of \( U(\mathbb{Z}_n) \).
3. Write \( U(\mathbb{Z}_n) \) in the form \( \{ r^0, r^1, \ldots, r^{\varphi(n)-1} \} \).
4. Find \( U^2(\mathbb{Z}_n) = \{ i^r \mod n : \gcd(i, \varphi(n)) = 1 \} \).

Note that the order of \( U^2(\mathbb{Z}_n) \) is \( \varphi(\varphi(n)) \).

For example, let \( n = 23 \). Then \( U(\mathbb{Z}_{23}) = \{ 1, 2, 3, \ldots, 22 \} \) and \( \varphi(23) = 22 \). A generator of \( U(\mathbb{Z}_{23}) \) is \( r = 5 \) as shown in Table 1.

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<td>5 ^6 \mod 5 ^3</td>
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Reducing the powers modulo 23, we have:

\( U^2(\mathbb{Z}_{23}) = \{ 5^i : \gcd(i, 22) = 1 \} = \{ 5^1, 5^5, 5^9, 5^{11}, 5^{13}, 5^{15}, 5^{17}, 5^{19}, 5^{21} \} \).

The order of \( U^2(\mathbb{Z}_{23}) \) is \( \varphi(\varphi(23)) = 10 \).

The operations of the ring \( U(\mathbb{Z}_n) \) are defined as follows [4]:

1. Addition operation: \( xy = xy \mod n \).
2. Multiplication operation: \( x \otimes y = x^{\varphi(n)} \mod n \), where \( r \) is the generator of \( U(\mathbb{Z}_n) \).
3. The power operation: Let \( \theta \) be an element of \( U^2(\mathbb{Z}_n) \) such that \( \theta = r^k \) and \( r \) is a generator of \( U(\mathbb{Z}_n) \). Then \( \theta^\nu = (r^k)^\nu \).
The identity of the second group of units of \( Z_n \) is \( r \),
where \( r \) is the generator of \( U(Z_n) \).
For the construction of \( U^2(Z_n) \) in case 2, consider:

- **Lemma 1**: Let \( n \) and \( m \) be any two positive integers,
  then \( \mathbb{Z}_m \cong \mathbb{Z}_n \times \mathbb{Z}_k \) iff \( \gcd(m, n) = 1 \).
  
  Hence, for \( n = n_1 \times n_2 \times \ldots \times n_k \),
  \( \mathbb{Z}_n \cong \mathbb{Z}_{n_1} \times \mathbb{Z}_{n_2} \times \ldots \times \mathbb{Z}_{n_k} \) iff
  \( n_1, n_2, \ldots, n_k \) are pairwise relatively prime.

- **Lemma 2**: 
  1. \( U(Z) \cong \{0\} \).
  2. \( U(Z) \cong Z_2 \).
  3. \( U(Z_{2k}) \cong Z_2 \oplus Z_{2k-1} \), for \( k \geq 3 \).
  4. \( U(Z_{p^n}) \cong Z_{p^n-1} \oplus Z_{p^n-1} \), where \( p \) is an odd prime.

- **Theorem 3**: If \( R = R_1 \oplus R_2 \oplus \ldots \oplus R_k \), then \( U(R) \cong U(R_1) \times U(R_2) \times \ldots \times U(R_k) \).
  
  For the case where \( n = 3p \):
  \( U(Z_3) \cong U(Z_2) \times U(Z_p) \cong Z_2 \times Z_{p-1} \).
  
  Hence, \( R^2 = Z_2 \circledast Z_{p-1} \) and
  \( U^2(R) \cong U(R^2) \cong U(Z_2) \circledast U(Z_{p-1}) \cong U(Z_2) \times U(Z_{p-1}) \cong U(Z_{p-1}) \).

- **Definition 2**: (Isomorphism Functions)
  1. The function \( f : U(Z_{m}) \rightarrow U(Z_{m}) \) defined by \( f(a) = (a \mod m, a \mod n) \), for all \( a \in U(Z_{m}) \),
     is an isomorphism whenever \( (m, n) = 1 \).
  2. The function \( f_1 : U(Z) \rightarrow Z_{(m,n)} \) defined by \( f_1(a) = \log_a \mod m, a \mod n \),
     for all \( a \in Z_{(m,n)} \), is an isomorphism whenever \( U(Z) \) is a cyclic and \( r \) is a generator of \( U(Z) \).

The group \( U^2(Z_n) \) can be constructed as follows:

1. Construct \( U(Z_2), U(Z_3) \) and \( U(Z_n) \).
2. Find \( G = \{ (a \mod 3), (a \mod p) : a \in U(Z_n) \} \).
3. Find a generator \( r \) of \( U(Z_3) \) and a generator \( r_1 \) of \( U(Z) \).
4. Write \( G \) in the form:
   \[ \left\{ (t \mod 3), r \mod p \mid 0 \leq t \leq 1 \text{ and } 0 \leq a \leq b - p \right\} \).
5. Form the set \( Z_2 \circledast Z_p - 1 = \{(t, t_i)\} \) and find \( G_1 \),
   the set of its invertible elements. Note that \( (a, b) \) is invertible in \( Z_2 \circledast Z_p - 1 \)
   iff \( a = 1 \) (invertible in \( Z_2 \)) and \( b \) is invertible in \( Z_p - 1 \).
6. \( U^2(Z_n) \) is the set of elements in \( U^2(Z_3) \) corresponding to \( G_1 \).

For example, let \( p = 11 \). Then, \( U(Z_{33}) \cong U(Z_3) \times U(Z_{11}) \cong Z_2 \circledast Z_{10} - 1 \),
where \( U(Z_{11}) = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11\} \) has \( 2 \) as a generator.
Similarly, \( 2 \) is a generator for \( U(Z_3) = \{1, 2\} \). The isomorphism between \( U(Z_{33}) \),
\( U(Z_3) \times U(Z_{11}) \) and \( Z_2 \circledast Z_{10} \) is depicted in Table 2. The invertible elements
in \( Z_2 \circledast Z_{10} \) are: \( \{(1,1), (1,3), (1,9), (1,7)\} \). Then, \( U^2(Z_{33}) \) = \{2, 8, 17, 29\}.

Define the operations on \( U^2(Z_n) \) as follows. Multiplication in \( U^2(Z_n) \), \( \bullet \) is defined by \( a \bullet b = f^{-1}(f(a) \otimes f(b)) \),
where \( f \) is the isomorphism \( f : U(Z_n) \rightarrow U(Z_2) \times U(Z_p) \) in Definition 2,
and
\[ f(a) \otimes f(b) = (a \mod 3, a \mod p) \otimes (b \mod 3, b \mod p) \]
\[ = (a \mod 3, b \mod 3, (a \mod p) \otimes (b \mod p), x \otimes y) = x^{a \cdot p^b \cdot y} \text{ and } x \otimes y = x^y \mod r. \]

Let \( a \in U^2(Z_n) \) and let \( N \) be a positive integer. Then, \( a^N = f^{-1}(r^N \cdot r_1^N) \).
The identity of \( U^2(Z_n) \) is the element \( a = f^{-1}(r, r_1) \).

### Table 2. Isomorphism between \( U(Z_{33}) \) and \( U(Z_3) \times U(Z_{11}) \).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>( U(Z_{33}) )</th>
<th>( U(Z_3) \times U(Z_{11}) )</th>
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<td>16</td>
<td>(1,16)</td>
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2.1. Elgamal Cryptosystem over \( U^2(Z_n) \) for Case 1.

**Algorithm 4**: Generator of \( U^2(Z_n) \)

1. Find a generator \( \theta \) of \( U(Z_n) \).
2. Write the order of \( U^2(Z_n) \) as \( p_{1}^{n_1} \cdot p_{2}^{n_2} \cdots p_{i}^{n_i} \).
3. Select a random integer \( s \), \( 0 \leq s \leq \phi(n)-1 \), \( (s, \phi(n)) = 1 \).
4. For \( j = 1 \) to \( i \), do:
   4.1. Compute \( \theta^{s/j} \mod n \).
   4.2. If \( \theta^{s/j} \mod n = \theta \), then go to step 3.
5. Return \( s \).

For key generation, entity A does the following:

**Algorithm 5**: Key Generation

1. Find a generator \( \theta \) of \( U(Z_n) \).
2. Find \( s \) using Algorithm 1.
3. Compute the order of \( U^2(Z_n) \) using \( \phi(\phi(n)) \).
4. Select a random integer \( a \), \( 2 \leq a \leq \phi(\phi(n)) - 1 \),
   and compute \( f = s^a \mod \phi(n) \).
5. A’s public key is \( (n, \theta, s, f) \) and A’s private key is \( a \).

B encrypts a message \( m \) for A using the algorithm below:

**Algorithm 6**: Encryption

1. B obtains A’s authentic public key \( (n, \theta, s, f) \).
2. Represent the message as an integer in \( U^2(Z_n) \).
3. Select a random integer \( k \), \( 2 \leq k \leq \phi(\phi(n)) - 1 \).
4. Compute \( q = s^k \mod \phi(n) \), \( r = f^k \mod \phi(n) \), \( \gamma = \theta^k \mod n \) and \( \delta = m^k \mod n \).
5. Send the ciphertext \( c = (q, \delta) \) to A.

To recover the plaintext \( m \) from \( c \), A should do the following:
Algorithm 7: Decryption

1. Use the private key \( a \) to compute \( b = \phi(\phi(n)) - a \).
2. Recover the message by computing \( t = q^i \pmod{\phi(p)} \).
3. Compute \( \delta = m(\theta)^t \pmod{n} \).

Theorem 4 proves that the formula \( \gamma^a \delta \pmod{n} \) allows the recovery of the message \( m \). The proof is for case 1.

- **Theorem 4**: Given a generator \( \theta \) of \( U^2(Z_n) \) such that \( \theta = \theta^t \), where \( \theta \) is a generator of \( U(Z_n) \). Let \( \gamma = \theta^t \pmod{n} \) and \( \delta^t = m(\theta)^t \pmod{n} \). If \( s \in U^2(Z_n) \) such that: \( s = \gamma^a \delta \pmod{n} \), then \( s = m \).

For example, consider the case where \( n = 3.5 \). Select the generator \( \theta \) of \( U(Z_n) \) such that \( \theta = \Theta^t \), where \( \Theta \) is a generator of \( U(Z_n) \). Let \( \gamma = \Theta^t \pmod{n} \) and \( \delta^t = m(\Theta)^t \pmod{n} \). If \( s \in U^2(Z_n) \) such that: \( s = \gamma^a \delta \pmod{n} \), then \( s = m \).

2.2. Elgamal Cryptosystem over \( U^2(Z_n) \) for Case 2

Algorithm 8: Generator of \( U^2(Z_n) \)

1. Find a generator \( \theta \) of \( U(Z_n) \).
2. Write the order of \( U^2(Z_n) \) as \( \phi(\phi(n)) = p^1_{1,1} \cdot p^2_{2,2} \cdots p^n_{n,n} \).
3. Select a random integer \( s \), \( 0 \leq s \leq \phi(p) - 1 \). \( (s, \phi(p)) = 1 \).
4. For \( j = 1 \) to \( 1 \), do:
   1. Compute \( \alpha_{1,n} \pmod{p} \).
   2. If \( \alpha_{1,n} \pmod{p} = \theta \), then go to step 3.
5. Use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to find \( \theta \) and \( s \) by solving the system of congruencies: \( s = 2 \pmod{3} ; x = 1 \).
6. Return \( s \).

To generate the key when \( n = 3.5 \), A uses the following:

Algorithm 9: Key Generation

1. Find a generator \( \theta \) of \( U(Z_n) \).
2. Find \( s \) as Algorithm 1.
3. Compute the order of \( U^2(Z_n) \) using \( \phi(\phi(n)) \).
4. Select a random integer \( a \), \( 2 \leq a \leq \phi(\phi(n)) - 1 \), and compute \( f = s^a \pmod{\phi(n)} \).
5. A’s public key is \((n, \theta, s, f)\) and A’s private key is \( a \).

B encrypts a message \( m \) for A using the algorithm below:

Algorithm 10: Encryption

1. B obtains A’s authentic public key \((n, \theta, s, f)\).
2. Represent the message as an integer as an integer in \( U^2(Z_n) \).
3. Select a random integer \( k \), \( 2 \leq k \leq \phi(\phi(n)) - 1 \).
4. Compute \( q = s^k \pmod{\phi(n)} \), \( r = f^k \pmod{\phi(n)} \), \( \gamma = \theta^k \pmod{n} \), \( \delta = m' \pmod{\phi(n)} \).
5. Send the ciphertext \( c = (q, \delta) \) to A.

To recover the plaintext \( m \) from \( c \), A should do the following:

Algorithm 11 (Decryption)

1. Use the private key \( a \) to compute \( b = \phi(\phi(p)) - a \).
2. Recover the message by computing \( t = q^i \pmod{\phi(p)} \).
3. Compute \( \gamma = \theta^t \pmod{n} \) and \( \delta = m(\theta)^t \pmod{n} \).

3. Elgamal Cryptosystem over \( U^2(Z_n[x]/<h(x)>) \)

Let \( h(x) \) be an irreducible polynomial of degree \( n \). Then, \( Z_n[x]/<h(x)> = \{ a_0 + a_1x + \cdots + a_nx^n : a_0, \ldots, a_n \in Z_n \} \) is a field. The order of \( Z_n[x]/<h(x)> \) is \( 2^n \) and its non-zero elements form a cyclic group \( U(Z_n[x]/<h(x)>) \) of order \( \phi(h(x)) = 2^n - 1 \), see [7] for more details.

- **Theorem 6**: \( U(Z_n[x]/<h(x)>) \) is cyclic iff one of the following conditions is satisfied:
  1. \( 2^n = q^a + 1 \) where \( q \) is an odd prime and \( a > 0 \).
  2. \( 2^n = q + 1 \), where \( q \) is a Mersenne prime [2].

To construct \( U(Z_n[x]/<h(x)>) \):

1. Find a generator \( r \) of the group of units \( U(Z_n[x]/<h(x)>) \).
2. Write \( U(Z_n[x]/<h(x)>) = \{ r^0, r^1, \ldots, r^{\varphi(h(x)) - 1} \} \).
3. Find \( U(Z_n[x]/<h(x)>) = \{ r^t \pmod{\varphi(h(x))} = 1 \} \).
4. Write \( U(Z_n[x]/<h(x)>) = \{ x : x = r^t \pmod{h(x)} \} \).

For example, let \( h(x) = 1 + x + x^3 \). Then, \( Z_n[x]/<1 + x + x^3> = \{ 0, 1, x, 1 + x, x^2, 1 + x^2, x + x^2, 1 + x + x^2 \} \), and \( U(Z_n[x]/<h(x)>) = \{ 1, x, 1 + x, x^2, 1 + x^2, x + x^2, 1 + x + x^2 \} \).

Using the fact that \( 1 + x + x^3 = 0 \) in \( Z_n[x]/<1 + x + x^3> \), we have \( 1 = (1 + x)^0, 1 + x = (1 + x)^1, 1 + x^2 = (1 + x)^2, x^2 = (1 + x)^3, 1 + x + x^2 = (1 + x)^4, x = (1 + x)^5, x + x^2 = (1 + x)^6 \), and \( r = 1 + x \) is a generator. Hence, \( U(Z_n[x]/<h(x)>) = \{ x, 1 + x, x^2, 1 + x^2, x + x^2, 1 + x + x^2 \} \).

Next, the Elgamal scheme is extended to the setting of the second group of units of \( U(Z_n[x]/<h(x)>) \).
In order to generate the corresponding public and private keys, entity A follows the steps below:

Algorithm 13: Key Generation

1. Select an irreducible polynomial \( h(x) \) of degree \( n \).
2. Find a generator \( \theta(x) \) of \( U(Z_2[x]/\langle h(x) \rangle) \).
3. Select a random integer \( k \), where \( 0 \leq k \leq \varphi(h(x)) - 1 \), and compute \( f = x^k \pmod{h(x)} \).
4. Compute \( \theta(x)^f = \theta(\theta(x))^f \pmod{h(x)}, \) and \( \delta(x) = m(x)^{\varphi(h(x))} \pmod{h(x)} \).
5. Send the ciphertext \( c = (q, r, t) \).

4. Testing and Evaluation

The modified Elgamal cryptosystem was tested and evaluated by implementing the modified algorithms. We used Mathematica 7.0 as a programming language and an HP computer with 1.73 GHZ CPU and 1014 MB RAM.

Using Mathematica 7.0, we have written programs for the following algorithms:

1. Elgamal with \( n \) in the form \( 2.3^a \).
2. Elgamal with \( n \) in the form \( 4.3^a \).
3. Elgamal with \( n \) in the form \( 3^a \).
4. Elgamal with \( n \) in the form \( 3.p \).
5. Elgamal with \( n \) in the form \( 3.2^a.p \).
6. Elgamal with \( n \) in the form \( 2.p^a+1 \).
7. Elgamal over the polynomial case.

After running the programs, it was clear that all the programs have generated a public and private key. A message is encrypted and is sent to a decryption scheme which recovered the message.

Table 3 and Figure 3 show the results obtained after running the Mathematica programs for 100 times. For more information on these programs, readers are referred to [5].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Key Generation</th>
<th>Encryption</th>
<th>Decryption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( n=3^a )</td>
<td>972.158</td>
<td>5116.84</td>
<td>2801.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n=2.3^a )</td>
<td>1941.4</td>
<td>10302.2</td>
<td>5669.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n=2^a.p^a+1 )</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>7736.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n=4.3^a )</td>
<td>2651.25</td>
<td>14160.9</td>
<td>21333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n=3.p )</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6.81421*10^(15)</td>
<td>6.81421*10^(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n=3.4.p )</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>5.14996*10^(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poly case</td>
<td>937.5</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Testing the modified Elgamal cryptosystems.

Comparing these algorithms with one another, one can conclude the following:

1. All programs are reliable. They can encrypt and decrypt any message.
2. For the irreducible polynomial case, it took considerable time to find an irreducible polynomial of high degree. Moreover, it takes more time to generate the public and private key than to decrypt or encrypt a message. Finally, it takes a considerable time to find some of the elements of \( U(Z_2[x]/\langle h(x) \rangle) \) when the degree of \( h(x) \) is high.
3. For cases 2, 3 and 4, the time needed for encryption is more than that needed for generating public and private keys and for decryption. But it works well even for \(a=10000\).

4. Cases 5, 6 and 7 are more efficient than others since they work for every prime number, even for primes consisting of 13 digits and they require less time for encryption, decryption and key generation.

5. The case where \(n=3p\) is the most efficient since it takes the least time for encryption, key generation and decryption.

6. In case 7, the time needed for decryption was much more than that needed for key generation and encryption.

### 4.1. The Discrete Logarithm Problem

The security of the Elgamal cryptosystem depends on the intractability of the Discrete Logarithm Problem: Let \(G\) be a finite cyclic group of order \(n\). Let \(a\) be a generator of \(G\), and \(\beta \in G\). The Discrete Logarithm of \(\beta\) to the base \(a\), denoted by \(\log_a \beta\), is the unique integer \(x\), \(0 \leq x \leq n-1\), such that \(\beta = a^x\).

To attack the modified Elgamal cryptosystem, we have to solve the Discrete Logarithm Problem. The most popular attack algorithm is the Baby-Step Giant-Step algorithm [11]:

Let \(m = \lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil\), where \(n\) is the order of \(a\). If
\[
\beta = a^x,
\]
then one can write \(x = im + j\), where \(0 \leq i, j < m\). Hence, \(a^x = a^m a^j\), which implies \(\beta(\beta^{-m})^i = a^j\).

**Algorithm 16: Baby-Step Giant-Step algorithm**

**Input:** a generator of a cyclic group \(G\) of order \(n\), and an element \(\beta \in G\)

**Output:** the discrete logarithm \(x = \log_a \beta\).

1. Set \(m = \lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil\).
2. Construct a table with entries \((j, a^j)\) for \(0 \leq j < m\). Sort this table by the second component.
3. Compute \(a^{-m}\) and set \(\gamma \leftarrow \beta\).
4. For \(i\) from 0 to \(m-1\) do the following:
   4.1 Check if \(\gamma\) is the second component of some entry in the table,
   4.2 If \(\gamma = a^j\) then return \(x = im + j\).
   4.3 Set \(\gamma \leftarrow \gamma a^{-m}\).

Below is a list of the implemented attack algorithms:

1. Baby giant with \(n = 2.3^a\).
2. Baby giant with \(n = 4.3^a\).
3. Baby giant with \(n = 3^a\).
4. Baby giant with \(n = 3.p\).
5. Baby giant with \(n = 3.2^a.p\).
6. Baby giant with \(n = 2.p^a+1\).

7. Irreducible polynomial baby giant.

In order to attack any protocol that uses Elgamal public key encryption scheme we have to solve the discrete logarithm problem. We enhanced the baby step giant step algorithm to work with the modified algorithms. Table 5 and Figure 2 show the results of running the programs 100 times in each case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Time needed in atto sec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(n=3^a)</td>
<td>3.041199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=2.3^a)</td>
<td>3.07689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=2p^a+1)</td>
<td>4.34042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=4.3^a)</td>
<td>3.20547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=3.p)</td>
<td>5.0357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=3.4.p)</td>
<td>2.96404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poly case</td>
<td>11.3508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.** The baby step giant step algorithm evaluation.

After running these attack algorithms, we observed the following:

1. All the attack programs are reliable so that they can hack an encrypted message by finding the private key.
2. In all the cases, the time needed to attack the modified cryptosystem is approximately the same.
3. The most difficult to attack is the irreducible polynomial case. This is due to the fact that mathematically it is complex and needs considerable computing time to find the modulus of a given polynomial with respect to a certain irreducible polynomial.
4. We were not able to run the programs on large values of \(p\) and large powers since it would take a considerable time to generate some of the elements of the second group of units in each case.

### 5. Conclusions

In this paper, we extended the Elgamal cryptosystem using the second group of units. We presented algorithms for the extended cryptosystem in the setting of \(U^2(Z_n)\) and provided numerical examples to illustrate the proposed scheme. We provided algorithms for the case of the second group of units of \(Z_n[x]/<h(x)>\) where \(h(x)\) is an irreducible polynomial. We also provided proofs that the proposed scheme does really recover the plaintext from the ciphertext. We also conducted testing and evaluation of the proposed scheme.
As for future work, we are currently investigating the case of \( n = 8.3^\alpha \) and \( 16.3^\alpha \) where different algorithms would be used. This due to the fact that 4 is relatively prime with neither \( 2.3^\alpha \) nor \( 4.3^\alpha \). We can also considering the cases where \( h(x) = x^2 \) and when \( h(x) \) is a product of irreducible polynomials whose degrees are pairwise relatively prime and using time stamps [13].

References


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