A Certificate-Based AKA Protocol Secure Against Public Key Replacement Attacks
Yang Lu, Quanling Zhang, and
Jiguo Li
College of Computer and
Information,
Abstract: Certificate-based cryptography
is a new public key cryptographic
paradigm that has many appealing features since it simultaneously solves the
certificate revocation problem in conventional public key cryptography and the key escrow problem
in identity-based cryptography. Till now, three certificate-based Authenticated
Key Agreement (AKA)
protocols have been proposed. However, our cryptanalysis shows that none of
them is
secure under the public key replacement attack. To overcome the security
weaknesses in these protocols, we develop a new certificate-based AKA protocol. In the random oracle model, we
formerly prove its security under the hardness of discrete logarithm problem,
computational Diffie-Hellman problem and bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem.
Compared with the previous proposals,
it enjoys lower computation overhead while providing stronger security
assurance. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first certificate-based AKA protocol that resists the public key replacement
attack in the literature so far.
Keywords: Key agreement, certificated-based
cryptography, public key replacement attack, random oracle model.